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by George W Kuney, Esq.

Successor Liability in Vermont
Introduction
Successor liability is an exception
to the general rule that, when one
corporate or other juridical person sells
assets to another entity, the assets are
transferred free and clear of all but
valid liens and security interests. When
successor liability is imposed, a creditor
or plaintiff with a claim against the seller
may assert that claim against and collect
payment from the purchaser.
Historically,
successor
liability
was a flexible doctrine, designed to
eliminate the harsh results that could
attend strict application of corporate
law. Over time, however, as successor
liability doctrines evolved, they became,
in many jurisdictions, ossified and
lacking in flexibility. As this occurred,
corporate lawyers and those who
structure transactions learned how to
avoid application of successor liability
doctrines.' This article summarizes what
has become of various species of nonstatutory successor liability in Vermont. 2
There are two broad groups of
successor liability doctrines, those that
are judge-made (the "common law"
exceptions) and those that are creatures
of statute. Both represent a distinct public
policy that, in certain instances and for
certain liabilities, the general rule of nonliability of a successor for a predecessor's
debts following an asset sale should not
apply. This article addresses the statues
of the first group, judge-made successor
liability in Vermont.
The current judge-made successor
liability law is a product of the rise of
corporate law in the last half of the
nineteenth century and early part of the
twentieth century. It appears to have
developed because of and in reaction
to the rise of corporate law. It may be
better to characterize it as a part of that
body of law, much like the "alter ego" or
"piercing the corporate veil" doctrines, 3
rather than as a creature of tort law,
although it is used as a tool by plaintiffs
who are involuntary tort claimants.
Many sources and authorities list four,
five, or six basic types of situations in
which judge-made successor liability has
sometimes been recognized-(1) express
or implied assumption, (2) fraud, (3) de
facto merger, (4) mere continuation, (5)
continuity of enterprise, and (6) product

line, for example.4 In fact, the matter
is more complicated than that. Each
of these species of successor liability
has, within it, different sub-species with
different standards and variations in the
jurisdictions that recognize them. Some
use a list of mandatory elements while
others are based on a non-exclusive
list of factors and considerations to be
weighed and balanced in a "totality of
the circumstances" fashion. Some that
began as an approach consisting of a
flexible list of factors have evolved into
one consisting of one or more mandatory
elements. In any event, to state that
there are only four, five, or six5 categories
is to oversimplify the matter.

_

The State of Successor
Liability in Vermont

When examined in detail, the types
of successor liability can be classified
into five general species, each of which
is specifically defined on a jurisdictionby-jurisdiction basis. The five categories
of successor liability addressed in this
article are: (1) intentional assumptions
of liabilities; (2) fraudulent schemes to
escape liability; (3) de facto mergers;
(4) the continuity exceptions-mere
continuation and continuity of enterprise;
and (5) the product line exception.
When examining successor liability,
one should keep in mind that there
is variance and overlap between the
species and their formulation in particular
jurisdictions. The label a court uses for
its test is not necessarily one with a
standardized meaning applicable across
jurisdictions. Accordingly, it is dangerous
to place too much reliance on a name;
the underlying substance should always
be examined.
1. Intentional (Express or Implied)
Assumption of Liabilities
Intentional assumption of liabilities,
express or implied, is probably the
simplest of the successor liability species.
Imposing liability on a successor that by
its actions is shown to have assumed
liabilities is essentially an exercise in
the realm of contract law, drawing
on doctrines of construction and the
objective theory of contract. 6 Vermont
recognizes the express or implied
assumption of liability as an exception
2007
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to the traditional rule of non-liability in
asset sales.7
2. Fraudulent Schemes to Escape
Liability
Fraudulent schemes to escape liability
by using corporate law limitation-ofliability principles to defeat the legitimate
interests of creditors illustrate an example
of the need for successor liability to
prevent injustice. If a corporation's
equity holders, for example, arrange
for the company's assets to be sold to a
new company in which they also hold an
equity or other stake for less value than
would be produced if the assets were
deployed by the original company in the
ordinary course of business, then the
legitimate interests and expectations
of the company's creditors have been
frustrated." By allowing liability to
attach to the successor corporation in
such instances, the creditors' interests
and expectations are respected. The
challenge, of course, is defining the
standard that separates the fraudulent
scheme from the legitimate one.
Vermont
recognizes
the
fraud
exception
to
successor
liability.9
Interestingly, the court thus appears
to have split the traditional fraud
analysis into two types, actual fraud and
constructive fraud, the later of which
appears to have only one elementinadequate consideration-rather than
the more common two alternative
element approach of the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act. 10
3. De Facto Merger
In a statutory merger, the successor
corporation becomes liable for the
predecessor's debts.11 The de facto
merger species of successor liability
creates the same result in the asset
sale context to avoid allowing form
to overcome substance. A de facto
merger, then, allows liability to attach
when an asset sale has mimicked the
results of a statutory merger except
for the continuity of liability. The main
difference between the sub-species of
de facto merger in various jurisdictions is
how rigid or flexible the test is. In other
words, how many required elements
must be shown to establish applicability
of the doctrine? On one end of the
spectrum is the lengthy, mandatory
www.vtbar.org
www.vtbar.org

checklist of required elements. On the
other, the non-exclusive list of factors
to be weighed in a totality of the
circumstances fashion.
The court in Cab-Tek, Inc. v. EBM,
Inc. addressed the distinction between2
1
consolidation and de facto merger.
Consolidation
occurs
when
the
"combining corporations are dissolved
and lose their identity in a new corporate
entity." 13 De facto merger occurs where
a corporation (1)takes control of all of the
assets of another corporation, (2) without
consideration, and (3) the predecessor
corporation ceases to function. 4 In other
words, no asset purchase is required for
a de facto merger in Vermont."5
4. Continuation of the Business: The
Continuity Exceptions
An exception with two distinct
subcategories permits successor liability
when the successor continues the
business of the seller: mere continuation
and continuity of enterprise. Each
has sub-species particular to specific
jurisdictions within them. The two
share roughly the same indications but
continuity of enterprise does not require
continuity of shareholders or directors
or officers between the predecessor and
the successor-a requirement said to be

one of the mere continuation exception's
dispositive elements or factors.' 6 Courts

are not altogether careful or uniform
in labeling which exception they are
applying. There appear to befourgeneral
sub-species of mere continuation and
three of continuity of enterprise. The
similarity of these doctrines to those of
de facto merger is striking. 7
A. Mere Continuation
The Gladstone court announced
the contours of the mere continuation
doctrine. The test, said the
court,
focuses on continuation of the corporate
entity, not its business.' 8 Traditional
indicators or factors for a finding of
continuation are a commonality of
officers, directors, and shareholders and
the existence of only one corporation
after the sale is complete. 9 Although
these are traditional indicators, they are
not requirements. 2° De facto merger,

on the other hand, focuses on the
absorption of one corporation's business
by another, and its traditional indicators
include similarity of assets, locations,
managements, personnel, shareholders,
and business practices.2 ' Inadequacy of
22
consideration may also be present.
The Gladstone court then returned
to the mere continuation doctrine

and considered its factors in declining
order of significance: (1) continuity of
ownership and management; (2) whether
only the successor corporation survived,
although survival as a mere shell or
for a short period is not significant; (3)
inadequate consideration; (4) similarity
of the business operated by the
successor to that of the predecessor; and
(5) continuation of business practices,
including how the company holds
itself out to the public. 23 The court
additionally considered whether or not
recognition of the transfer as being free
and clear of liabilities would work a fraud
on creditors through a breach of the
fiduciary duty that corporations and their
directors owe to creditors of insolvent
corporations on those
operating in the
24
zone of insolvency.
B. The Two Species of Continuity of
Enterprise
Unlike the more traditional and longstanding mere continuation exception,
the continuity of enterprise theory
does not require strict continuity of
shareholders or owners (and possibly
directors and officers) between the
predecessor and
the successoralthough the degree or extent of
continuity of owners, directors, and
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officers is a factor.2 Further, continuity
of enterprise generally does not include
the requirement of dissolution of the
predecessor upon or soon after the sale,
which is often a factor-and sometimes
a requirement-in jurisdictions applying
26
the mere continuation doctrine.
A detailed examination of continuity
of enterprise in the jurisdictions that
have adopted it discloses three subspecies at work. All the variations of
the continuity of enterprise exception
from Turner v. Bituminous Cas.
derive
27
Co.

Variations

in the application of

the Turner factors create the three subspecies.
In Turner, the Michigan Supreme Court
expanded the four traditional categories
of successor liability, and in so doing,
developed a continuity of enterprise
28
theory of successor liability. The court

adopted the rule that, in the sale of
corporate assets for cash, three criteria
would be the threshold guidelines to
establish whether there is continuity of
enterprise between the transferee and
the transferor corporations:
(1) there is a continuation of the
enterprise of the seller corporation,
so that there is a continuity of
management, personnel, physical
location, assets, and general business
operations;
(2) the seller corporation ceases
its ordinary business operations,
liquidates, and dissolves as soon as
legally and practically possible; and
purchasing
corporation
(3) the
liabilities
and
assumes
those
obligations of the seller ordinarily
interrupted
for
the
necessary
continuation of normal business
29
operations of the seller corporation.
The Michigan Supreme Court did not
address the limits of the continuity of
enterprise exception again until 1999
in Foster v. Cone-Blanchard Mach.
Co. 30 In Foster, a plaintiff, injured while

operating a feed screw machine, sued

the corporate successor after receiving
a $500,000 settlement from the
predecessor corporation.31 The court
held that "because [the] predecessor was
available for recourse as witnessed by
plaintiff's negotiated settlement with the
predecessor for $500,000, the continuity
of successor liability
of enterprise theory
2
3

is inapplicable."

The Foster court thus resolved two
issues left open in Turner. First, the
Michigan appellate decisions prior to
Foster cited Turner for the proposition
that the continuity of enterprise test was
comprised of four elements or factors,
following the four items enumerated in
the Turner court's holding and not the
three listed in its announcement of the
rule. 33 The Foster court clarified that,

in fact, only three items are involved in
the Turner4 rule, and they are required
3
elements.
Second, the Foster court held that
the "'continuity of enterprise' doctrine
applies only when the transferor is no
longer viable and capable of being
sued." 35 The court's interpretation of the
underlying rationale of Turner was "to
provide a source of recovery for injured
plaintiffs." 36According to Justice Brickley,
the Turnercourt expanded liability based
on the successor's continued enjoyment
of "certain continuing benefits": "[T]he
test in Turner is designed to determine
whether the company (or enterprise)
involved in the lawsuit is essentially
the same company that was allegedly
negligent in designing or manufacturing
the offending product.

3

The Foster decision thus appears
to return Michigan law to its state
immediately after Turner was decided:
continuity of enterprise is a recognized
doctrine of successor liability and the
doctrine has three required elements.
To the extent that intervening decisions
had narrowed Turner with the addition of
a fourth factor-whether the purchasing
corporation holds itself out to the world
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as the effective continuation of the
seller corporation-that revision of the
doctrine appears to have been reversed.
Further, to the extent that Turner's
"guidelines"
had been considered
factors by other courts adopting the
continuity of enterprise, the Foster court
made it clear that it interpreted its own
rule as one comprised of elements.
In Vermont, the Gladstone court
noted that in Ostrowski v. Hydra-Tool
Corp., 38 it had declined to adopt either
the continuity of enterprise or product
line doctrines because the successor did
not create the risk of harm or benefit
from the proceeds of the product's sale,
did not invite the product's use or make
any safety representations, and could
not enhance the safety of the product
given that it had already been released
39
into the market.

5. The Product Line Exception of Ray v.
Alad

In Ray v. Alad,40 the California
Supreme Court recognized the product
line exception to the general rule of
successor non-liability. It is a species of
liability that is very similar to continuity
of enterprise. The court articulated the
following "justifications" for imposing
liability on a successor corporation:
(1) the virtual destruction of the
plaintiff's remedies against the original
manufacturer caused by the successor's
acquisition of the business;41 (2) the
successor's ability to assume the original
manufacturer's risk spreading role; and
(3) the fairness of requiring the successor
to assume a responsibility for defective
products that was a burden necessarily
attached to the original manufacturer's
goodwill being enjoyed by the
successor in the continued operation of
the business. The term "justifications"
is somewhat ambiguous as to whether
it connotes required elements or nonexclusive factors to be balanced, much
like the Turner guidelines. Like the
Michigan Supreme Court in Foster,
which revisited Turner some years after
the original opinion was issued, the
California Supreme Court returned to
Ray v. Alad some years later to "clarify"
things. In Henkel Corp. v. Hartford Acc.
& Indemn. Co., 42 the court referred to
these three justifications as conditions,
thus suggesting that they were essential
elements under the product line
exception.
Despite its name, the product line
theory of successor liability appears only
rarely, if at all, to have been applied in a
reported decision to a successor that had
www.vrbar.org
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acquired merely one of many product
lines from the predecessor; in nearly
all reported cases, it appears to have
been applied to sales of substantially
all of a predecessor's assets. 43 In fact,
one court has emphasized that the
"policy justifications for our adopting
the product line rule require the transfer
of substantially all of the predecessor's
44
assets to the successor corporation."
The product line doctrine, where
accepted, breaks into two distinct
sub-species. The two differ only as to
whether Ray's "virtual destruction of the
plaintiff's [other] remedies" condition
is strictly required in order to permit
recovery.
The Gladstone court declined to adopt
the product line doctrines because the
successor did not create the risk of harm
or benefit from the proceeds of the
product's sale, did not invite the product's
use or make any safety representations,
and could not enhance the safety of the
product given that it had already been
released into the market.

4

1

Conclusion
This article and its more detailed
companion pieces in the Florida State
University Business Review and on the
author's website attempt to detail some
of the history and the current condition
of successor liability law in Vermont. The
purpose of the doctrines was to provide
contract and tort creditors with an
avenue of recovery against a successor
entity in appropriate cases when the
predecessor that contracted with them
or committed the tort or the action
that later gave rise to the tort had sold
substantially all of its assets and was no
longer a viable source of recovery. Its
various species acted as a pressure relief
valve on the strict limitation of liability
created by corporate law. The doctrine
is in the nature of an "equitable"
doctrine insofar as it is invoked when
strict application of corporate law would
offend the conscience of the court. In
large part, the doctrine remains intact
and still serves that purpose.
George W Kuney, Esq., is Associate
Professor of Law and Director of the
Clayton Center for Entrepreneurial Law
at The University of Tennessee College
of Law. He is the author of THE ELEMENTS
OF
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Carolina, 30

WAKE FOREST L. REv. 889, 894
(1995).
12 571 A.2d 671 (Vt. 1990).
13 Gladstone, 878 A.2d at 220-21 (citing CabTek, Inc. v. E.B.M., Inc, 571 A.2d 671, 672 (Vt.
1990)).
14 Id. at 221.

review and other articles dealing with
business, contracts, Chapter 11, and
insolvency issues.
1 See George W. Kuney, A Taxonomy and
Evaluation of Successor Liability, 3 FLA. ST. U.

15 Id.

Bus. REV. 1 (2006).

A detailed jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction
analysis and explanation of the state of judgemade successor liability law may be found at
www.law.utk.edu/Faculty/APPENDIXKuney.
htm. The author intends to update this
analysis at least twice a year so that it remains
current.
I See generally Steven L. Schwarcz,
Collapsing Corporate Structures: Resolving
the Tension Between Form and Substance,
60 Bus. LAw. 109 (2004).

16 REST. 3D TORTS §

2

12, cmt. g; AM. L.

PROD.

LIAB. 3D § 7:20 (2004). See, e.g., Holloway v.

John C. Smith's Sons, 432 F. Supp. 454, 456
(D.S.C. 1977) (denying summary judgment to
the defendant successor in a products liability
suit because: (1) the business continued
at its same address with virtually all of the
previous employees; (2) the successor was
responsible for maintenance and repairs on
the products sold by the predecessor prior to
its sale of assets; (3) the successor continued
manufacturing the same or similar products
as the predecessor; and (4) the successor
held itself out to the public as a business
entity under a virtually identical name as
its predecessor; not requiring continuity of
ownership and control but calling the doctrine
applied "mere continuation" anyway.); see
also Mozingo v. Correct Mfg., 752 F.2d 168,
175 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying Mississippi law
and citing Holloway Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501
F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974) (upon which Holloway
relied) as cases following the continuity of
enterprise theory); AM. L. PROD. LIAB. 3d § 7:22
(noting that the court in Holloway denied
summary judgment to a successor despite a
lack of continuity of ownership even though
the court treated its ruling as an application
of the mere continuation theory); 2 MADDEN
& OWN ON PROD. LIAB. § 19:6, n. 25 (3d. ed.
2003) (noting an increasing number of courts
have adopted the continuity of enterprise
exception including the Holloway court and
the Ohio Supreme Court in Flaugher v. Cone
Automatic Mach. Co., 30 Ohio St. 3d (1987)
(this treatise is authored by David Owen, the
Carolina Distinguished Professor of Law at
the University of South Carolina); Richard L.
Cupp, Jr., Redesigning Successor Liability,
1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 845, 854-55, n. 44 (1999)
(noting that states following the continuity of
enterprise approach include South Carolina
(citing Holloway); Ohio (citing Flaugher),
Alabama, Michigan, Mississippi, and New
Hampshire (citing Cyr v. B. Offen); Philip I.
Blumberg, The Continuity of the Enterprise
Doctrine:
Corporate
Successorship
in
United States Law, 10 FLA. J. INT'L L. 365,
375-76 (1996) (collecting cases applying the
continuity of enterprise theory, including
Holloway and Flaugher); 30 S.C. JUR. PRODUCTS

4 See Savage Arms, Inc. v. Western Auto

Supply Co., 18 P.3d 49 (2001) (discussing
varied approaches to determination of
whether successor liability was a creature of
contract and corporate law or tort law as part
of its choice of law analysis, collecting cases
and other authorities on both sides of the
issue, and concluding that successor liability is
a tort doctrine designed to expand products
liability law).
I The variance in states' approaches to
successor liability and to the related doctrines
of alter ego or piercing the corporate veil are
one of the reasons that the federal courts
have adopted a uniform federal common law
of these subjects under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). See
United States v. General Battery Corp., 423
F3d 294, 298-301 (3d Cir. 2005) (collecting
authorities).
6
Michael J. Zaino, Bielagus v. EMRE:
New Hampshire Rejects Traditional Test for
Corporate Successor Liability Following an
Asset Purchase, 45.N.H. B.J 26 (2004).
1 Gladstone v. Stuart Cinemas, Inc., 878
A.2d 214 (Vt. 2005).

Causation is a required element of all
species of the fraud exception. See, e.g.,
Milliken & Co. v. Duro Textiles, LLC, 19
MASS L. REP. 509 (2005) (discussing need for
causation, but also that judgment creditors
could look to company's long term prospects,
8

not just immediate insolvency).

9 Gladstone v. Stuart Cinemas, Inc., 878
A.2d 214 (Vt. 2005).
10See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 348 (2006) (UFTA as

enacted as part of the Bankruptcy Code).
11G. William Joyner, Ill, Beyond Budd Tire:
Examining Successor Liability in North
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LIABILITY § 12 (stating that the court in Holloway
denied the successor's motion for summary
judgment "where the evidence indicated that
the [successor] was a mere continuation of
the predecessor corporation"); REST. 3D TORTS
§ 12, cmt. c (citing only Alabama, Michigan,
and New Hampshire as jurisdictions that have
adopted the continuity of enterprise theory).
17 Gladstone v. Stuart Cinemas, Inc., 878
A.2d 214, 221-22 (Vt. 2005). Cases from the
beginning of the last century in Idaho preserve
another term that seems to capture all or part
of the de facto merger, mere continuation,
and continuity of enterprise exceptions:
"reorganization." See infra notes 272 to 274
and accompanying text.
18 Id. at 222.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Gladstone, 878 A.2d at 222.
23 Id. at 222-223.
24 Id. at 224.
21 Mozingo, 752 F.2d at 174-75 (noting that
the traditional mere continuation exception
requires identity of stockholders, directors
and officers); see also Savage Arms Inc. v.
Western Auto Supply, 18 P.2d 49, 55 (Alaska
2001) (mere continuation theory requires "the
existence of identical shareholders").
26 See, e.g., Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co.,
244 N.W.2d 873, 882 (Mich. 1976) (dissolution
of the seller soon after the sale one of four
enumerated factors indicating continuity of
enterprise).
27 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976).
28 Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d
873 (Mich. 1976).
29 Id. at 879 (citing McKee v. Harris-Seybold

Co., Div. of Harris-lntertype Corp., 264 A.2d
98, 103, 105 (1970)). These are three of the
four factors from McKee used to determine
whether liability will arise under the de facto
merger form of successor liability.
30 597
N.W.2d 506 (Mich. 1999). In the
interim, the court cited Turner in three
decisions, none of which clarified the key
Turner holding: Jeffery v. Rapid American
Corp., 529 N.W.2d 644, 656 (Mich. 1995)
(citing Turner for the proposition that
corporate law principles should not be rigidly
applied in products liability cases); Stevens v.
McLough Steel Prods. Corp., 466 N.W.2d 95,
99 (Mich. 1989) (citing Turner as a case where
the Michigan Supreme Court discussed the
doctrine of successor liability in the context
of a products liability suit); Langley v. Harris
Corp., 321 N.W.2d 662, 664-65 (Mich. 1982)
(citing Turner for the proposition that an
acquiring corporation maybe held liable
for products liability claims arising from
activities of its predecessor corporation
under a continuity of enterprise theory, but
then holding that the Turner rationale will not
allow a corporation to seek indemnity from
the plaintiff's employer in a products liability
suit). One appellate court decision between
Turner and Foster concluded that satisfying
the fourth consideration in Turner (the
purchasing corporation's holding itself out as
a continuation of the selling corporation) was
not sufficient for a finding of successor liability
where the first three considerations were not
met. Pelc v. Bendix Mach. Tool Corp., 314
N.W.2d 614,620 (Mich. Ct. App. 982) (Where
a successor bought only 8 percent of the
assets of another corporation in a bankruptcy
sale and did not meet the first three criteria

of Turner, but held itself out as a continuation
of the liquidating corporation, the mere
continuation test was not satisfied. The court
noted that to impose successor liability in
such circumstances would effectively be
an adoption of the broader "product line
exception").
11 597 N.W.2d at 508.
32 Id.
33 Fenton Area Pub. Sch. v. Sorensen-Gross
Constr. Co., 335 N.W.2d 225-26 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1983); Lemire v. Garrard Drugs, 291
N.W.2d 103, 105 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980);
Powers v. Baker-Perkins, Inc., 285 N.W.2d
402, 406 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979); Pelc, 314
N.W.2d at 618; State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins.
Co. v. Pitney-Bowes, 1999 WL 33451719, at
*1 (Mich. Ct. App. April 2, 1999).
14 597 N.W. 2d at 510.
35 Foster, 597 N.W.2d at 511.
36 Id. Justice Brickley, in dissent, disagreed
with the majority as to the underlying rationale
of Turner.
31 Id. at 513.
38 479 A.2d 126 (Vt. 1984).
39 Gladstone, 878 A.2d at 220 (citing
Ostrowski, 479 A.2d at 127).
40 560 R2d 3 (Cal. 1977).
41 Id. at 9.
42 62 R3d 69, 73 (Cal. 2003).
43 George W. Kuney & Donna C. Looper,
Successor Liability in California, 20 CEB CAL.
Bus L. PRACT. 50 (2005).
44 Hall v. Armstrong Cork, Inc., 103 Wash. 2d
258, 260 n.1 (1984) (refusing to apply product
line test to successor that purchased but one
of many asbestos product lines).
45 Gladstone, 878 A.2d at 220 (citing
Ostrowski, 479 A.2d at 127).
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defense when it's needed. As part of an insurance organization with over $60
billion in assets and an "A" rating from A.M. Best, we have the financial
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CNA understands the potential risks lawyers face every day. Since 1961, our
Lawyers Professional Liability Program has helped firms manage risk with a
full range of insurance products, programs and services, and vigorous legal

strength you can count on.
See how we can protect your firm by contacting
Smith Bell & Thompson Insurance at 800-735-1800.
/

For over 25 years, Smith, Bell & Thompson has provided insurance
solutions to attorneys. With CNA we bring stability and strength to
the professional liability marketplace in Maine, New Hampshire and
Vermont. Contact us and put us to work for you.
www.sbtinsurance.com / www.lawyersinsurance.com
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